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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the aviation screening process and sought to determine if
the federalization of the screening process had any effect on the number of firearm
confiscations at civilian aviation screening checkpoints. The hypothesis of the study was
that airport screening firearms confiscations (per one million screenings) were lower
before the U.S. government (TSA) took over screening in 2001-2002. This quantitative
research required the performance of an interrupted time series analysis. Interrupted time
series analysis evaluates the impact of one or more events on the values in the time series.
An interrupted time series analysis attempts to determine whether an outside event
affected subsequent observations. For an example, did the implementation of a new
economic policy improve economic performance, did a new gun ordinance reduce violent
crimes; or in this study, did the federalization of civilian airport screening increase the
number of confiscated firearms. Such comparison of an interrupted time series was
applied to this study of firearm confiscations at airport checkpoints.
Due to limited publically available data and inconsistencies in data collection,
firearms were the only category of confiscations available that provided sufficient data
points (years of data) to conduct quantitative research. The first data set includes persons
screened and firearms confiscated from years 1990 through 2000. The second set of data
includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from years 2003 through 2009. The
total data that was used spans a twenty year period (1990-2009). An examination the
theoretical screening process model used by the private sector and the process model
currently in use by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was performed to
v

determine if any technological advances or changes in screening process may have had
an effect on the statistical results.
The results of the investigation revealed the following findings:
1. There was no statistically significant difference between the number of firearm
confiscations by private screeners and the number of firearms confiscated by government
screeners.
2. Advancements in screening technology and screening processes had little to no
effect on the number of confiscated firearms between both theoretical process models.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I.

PAGE

Background ...................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................ 4
Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................... 5
Potential Significance ..................................................................................... 5
Organization of the Study ............................................................................... 6

II.

Literature Review ............................................................................................ 7
Policy and Regulation ..................................................................................... 7
Public Perception and Privacy ........................................................................ 13
Screening Technology and Performance ........................................................ 15

III.

Methodology ................................................................................................... 27
Context of the Study ....................................................................................... 27
Research Hypothesis ....................................................................................... 27
Data Collection ............................................................................................... 27
Application of Time-Series Analysis .............................................................. 28
Data Analysis .................................................................................................. 29
Assumptions.................................................................................................... 32
Limitations ...................................................................................................... 32
Subjectivities or Bias ...................................................................................... 32

IV.

Research Findings and Analysis ..................................................................... 33
Rate of Firearm Confiscations Per One Million Persons ................................ 35
Firearms Confiscated Averages ...................................................................... 38
Group 1 Average ....................................................................................... 38
Group 2 Average ....................................................................................... 38
Yearly Change in Confiscated Firearms ......................................................... 39
Percentage Change in Confiscated Firearms .................................................. 41
Hypothesis Test ............................................................................................... 43
Degrees of Freedom ........................................................................................ 44
vii

Critical Value .................................................................................................. 44
Determining Variance ..................................................................................... 44
T-Test Calculation .......................................................................................... 46
T-Value Test Statistic ..................................................................................... 47
2001 Theoretical Screening Process Model (Private Screening Model) ........ 48
Current Theoretical Screening Process Model (TSA Screening Model) ........ 52
Theoretical Process Model Comparative Analysis ......................................... 58
V.

Discussions and Implications .......................................................................... 60
Future Research .............................................................................................. 61
Summary ......................................................................................................... 62

List of References .................................................................................................... 65

viii

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

1. Groups of Data ……………………………………………………..........34
2. Firearms Confiscated per One Million Persons ………………………….36
3. Average Confiscated Firearms by Year ………………………………….39
4. Average Confiscated Firearms by Group………………………………...39
5. Yearly Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million ……………………40
6. Yearly Percentage Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million …….....42

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

1. Rate of Firearms Confiscated Per One Million Screened ………………..37
2. Yearly Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million…………………….41
3. Yearly Percentage Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million ………..43
4. 2001 Screening process passenger flow prior to federalization …………49
5. Theoretical process model used in the 2001 checkpoint screening of
passengers and accessible property (Private Screening Process Model) ...51
6. Layers of U.S. Aviation Security …………………………………..........52
7. Current Screening Process Model (TSA Screening Model) ……………..54
8. Current screening checkpoint process model of passengers and
accessible property (TSA Screening Process Model) ……………………57

x

Chapter 1

Background
An Eastern Airlines Flight 1320 en route from Newark New Jersey to Boston,
Massachusetts on March 17, 1970, was hijacked by passenger John DiVivo when he
entered the cockpit with a loaded gun ordering the crew to continue flying the plane until
it ran out of fuel and crashed. The crew fought back managing to disarm DiVivo and shot
him. First Officer James Hartley was mortally wounded during the altercation and
Captain Robert Wilbur was injured during the flight but managed to land the plane safely.
In 1974, Samuel Byck, using a stolen pistol, shot and killed an airport police officer
before attempting to hijack an aircraft with the intent to crash it into the White House.
Byck boarded a Delta Airlines DC-9 and ordered the pilots to take off. When the pilots
refused, they were both shot, killing the first officer. An FBI agent ended the altercation
when he fired though a window of the aircraft's door killing Byck before the plane was
able to take off (Price, 2009).
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and was foundation of policies, procedures and regulations in the aviation
industry. It wasn't until the 1960s did aviation security become an issue. In 1961, Antuilo
Ramierez Ortiz used a gun to force the flight crew of a National Airlines' jet to divert to
Cuba and thus became the first U.S. hijacker (Department of State, 2006). The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) began the Sky Marshal program, its first major security
program, in 1968. The program placed undercover law enforcement officers or
antiterrorist agents on board commercial aircrafts to counter aircraft security incidents
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Prior to the 1970s, airports had minimal security, but the sudden rise in airport
incidents and aircraft hijackings led to the implementation of security measures. The
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1971 was the first aviation security act that outlined punishments
for hijackers and mandated passenger screening but not the screening of carry-on
baggage. During this time, airlines voluntarily implemented security screening of
baggage and passengers. In 1972, the FAA began requiring that all airlines screen
passengers and their carry-on baggage by 1973. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 required
the screening of all passengers and all property. The act placed the responsibility for
passenger screening onto the air carriers. Screening services were generally contracted to
private security companies by air carriers. Airlines that had operational control of
individual concourses provided security services at a checkpoint. Although security
services were contracted out to private companies, the FAA had regulatory oversight of
security processes. This was highly criticized as screening services were typically
contracted out to the lowest bidder rather than the most effective screeners.
The 1980s began with a new round of hijackings from the United States to Cuba
setting a record of eighteen in 1980 and fifteen more in 1983 (Department of State,
2006). Soon after, a bilateral anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and
Cuba, effectively ended hijackings between the two countries. In 1985, the FAA restarted
the Sky Marshal program and transformed it into the Federal Air Marshal Service which
continues to operate today. By 1990, the implementation of new policies led to a
significant decrease in attacks on aviation and was followed by more than ten years of
relative calm in aviation security. This decrease was in large part due to the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990. The act led to more comprehensive regulations on
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access control systems for airports and also required the screening of airport and airlines
personnel.
Characteristics of hijackings during the 60s, 70s, and 80s were often only one or
two hijackers that used guns, grenades, bombs, or the threat of a bomb to take over a
flight. A premise in hijackings before 9/11 was that hijackers were more interested in an
outside cause (escape, extortion, political message) than in using the aircraft as a guided
missile. Thurs, before 9/11 the goal of the flight crews during a hijacking was to land the
aircraft so authorities on the ground could take over negotiations. This assumption does
not work in a post-9/11 world where aircraft are used as weapons of mass destruction and
hostages are merely victims to the end result (Price, 2009). With the more recent
motivation of hijacking planes to be used as guided missiles against ground targets, the
threat of seizing a plane by gun is still prominent.
The most elaborate terrorist attack in U.S. history occurred on September 11,
2001, when 19 hijackers boarded four domestic flights throughout the United States. The
results included the deaths of nearly 3,000 civilians, military deployments in two
countries, and a complete transformation of American aviation and homeland security. In
response to the September 11th, 2001, attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA) was enacted by congress on November 19th, 2001 (ATSA, 2001). This act
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the U.S. Department of
Transportation. TSA’s primary responsibility is for the safety and security of the
traveling public in the United States. TSA oversees security for highways, railroads,
buses, mass transit systems, pipelines, and ports, but the majority of the TSA’s efforts are
in aviation security. Aviation security consumes approximately 71% of the TSA’s annual
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budget which amounts to approximately 4.8 billion dollars (Congressional Report, 2008).
Proponents of the TSA argued that a single federal agency would better protect air travel
than the private companies who operated under contract to single airlines or groups of
airlines that operated terminals. The federal and state governments and general aviation
industry all play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal
government provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and provides some
funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on
airport operators.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was established in November 2002 with the
intention to consolidate U.S. executive branch organizations related to the security of the
United States. Twenty two government agencies were moved under the new Department
of Homeland Security. The TSA was moved from the Department of Transportation to
the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003 (107th Congress, 2002).
Statement of the Problem
Since the federalization of civilian aviation screening, no major terroristic events
have occurred in the United States involving a firearm. However, security breaches and
incidents are disturbingly common. Several issued reports show the failure of undercover
security tests at checkpoints where TSA personnel failed to detect explosive devices,
guns, and other weapons (GAO, 2007). Criticism involving the level of security and
violations of personal privacy remain major issues to be confronted by the TSA.
Questions remain as to whether the government takeover of screening services has
improved security over its private counterparts prior to 9/11. A significant amount of
resources have been allocated towards the improvement of aviation security. Within
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aviation security, passenger and baggage screening are the most important and visible
processes mitigating potential threats to the aviation environment. But this still leaves the
question of has the federalization of security screening brought about change in the
amount of confiscated firearms?
Purpose of the Study
Observing and experiencing the transformation of aviation security here in the
United States throughout life and reviewing past research led to performing a policy
analysis of the federalization of the airport screening and confiscated weapons. Has the
government takeover of airport screening in 2001-2002 increased the number of firearm
confiscations at screening checkpoints? This study probes if the federalization of the
aviation screening process had any effect on the rate of confiscated weapons at airport
screening checkpoints. I hypothesize that airport screening firearm confiscations (per one
million screenings) were lower before the U.S. government (TSA) took over screening in
2001-2002.
Potential Significance
The potential significance of this research is that it challenges the current and past
screening models used by the private and public sectors. The results may help illustrate
the differences and similarities in each checkpoint screening model. The findings of this
study may provide quality information to our policy and lawmakers to assist them in
making informed decisions on aviation security and to continually improve our screening
models and methods.
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Organization of the Study
This study is presented in chapters as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction
that briefly addresses the purpose of the study and the relevance of the research. Chapter
2 presents a review of related literature. The literature is reviewed in the areas of aviation
security policy and regulation, public perception/privacy, screening technology and
performance, and applications of time-series analysis. In Chapter 3, the methodology for
the study is explained. Quantitative research is presented as the primary type of research
used in this study. A time-series analysis was conducted from archival data and
descriptive data obtained from government reports. Chapter 4 includes the research
findings and analysis. Discussions and implications of the findings are included in
Chapter 5. References and Appendices are included in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review
This study seeks to expand the research on civilian aviation security and the
civilian and baggage screening process by focusing on the 2001-2002 federalization of
screening and its impact on confiscated firearms at screening checkpoints.
Applicable research that is available relates to policy and regulation, screening
technology and performance, public perception and applications of time series analysis.
Some issues may have the tendency to overlap into more than one category. Policy
changes may impact the screening technology used, which may lead to a change in public
perception. A good example of a policy which led to changes in screening technology
and public perception is the implementation of active millimeter wave and backscatter
technologies or commonly referred to as full-body scanners. The literature review was
designed to explore these four areas of research.
Policy and Regulation
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, there has been
a growing awareness of the risk to aviation and other forms of transportation from
terrorism. This has encouraged governments and international organizations to develop
strategies to reduce the risk of such attacks. George and Whatford (2007) examined the
continuously expanding range of regulatory initiatives that have impacted the many
forms of public transportation, but specifically examining aviation. The goal was to
define the common practices that were required in order to strengthen aviation security.
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George and Whatford (2007) explored this issue through a series of case studies
and document analysis and examining international security policies and regulations.
Some of the documentation examined included regulations from the European Union, the
Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Various organizations, regulatory bodies and associations have provided governments
with direction when developing their own domestic regulation. The first convention that
addressed aviation crime was the 1963 Tokyo Contention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. This was the grandfather of aviation regulation and
law that established rules on jurisdiction. One of the more modern and most important
international organizations in the aviation sector is the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations
headquartered in Canada. The ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action carries out regular
mandatory audits to ensure aviation security measures are in place at all participating
territories. Other regulating bodies include the International Air Transport Association
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Whatford found that the following is a
consensus of what needs to occur in order to strengthen aviation security: (1) The
intelligence structure and mode of operation within central government need to be
complemented with the work and contingency plans of the police and the private security
industry, and the private sector. (2) There must be coordination and collaboration
afforded across both domestic and international security structures. (3) An effective
international legal and financial framework must be established.
In 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the state of
general aviation security through determining what actions the federal government has
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taken to identify and assess threats and vulnerabilities to general aviation, the steps the
federal government has taken to strengthen general aviation security and along with the
challenges that the government faces, and what steps non-federal stakeholders have taken
to enhance the security of general aviation (GAO, 2004a).
The methodology used in examining the state of general aviation security and to
answer the questions presented by the GAO was the use of qualitative research through
conducting interviews with federal agents, quantitative research though analyzing data
from the FAA, and examining documentation from various agencies. GAO officials
interviewed individuals in the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of
Transportation Security Policy, Office of Operations Policy, and General Aviation
Operations and Inspections Office on TSA’s role in enhancing general aviation security.
Documentation obtained from various government agencies such as the TSA, Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was examined on
providing means of obtaining and disseminating intelligence information, intelligence
regarding potential terrorist misuse of general aviation, and documented plans to
implement a risk management approach to assess threats and vulnerabilities to civil
aviation.
The GAO found that federal and state governments and general aviation industry
all play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal government
provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and provides some funding, the
bulk of responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport operators.
Although a very limited assessment of general aviation has been done, a systematic
assessment of threats has not been conducted. The TSA plans to issue a self-assessment
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tool to assess airport vulnerabilities for airport operators’ use, but does not plan to
conduct on-site assessments at all airports due to cost and other factors. TSA has not yet
developed an implementation plan for its risk management efforts. TSA and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to address security risks through
regulation and guidance such as regulating background checks for U.S. flight training
schools, however they still face challenges in further enhancing security. The FAA has
not established written policies and procedures for reviewing and validating the need for
flight restrictions. Non-federal aviation stakeholders have partnered with the federal
government and have taken steps to enhance security. Proof of this partnership between
private organization and the TSA have led to the development of the Airport Watch
Program. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has partnered with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to develop a nationwide Airport Watch
Program that uses more than 600,000 pilots as eyes and ears for observing and reporting
suspicious activity (AOPA, 2011). According to the AOPA's website, the Airport Watch
Program includes warning signs for airports, informational literature, and a training video
to teach pilots and airport employees how to enhance security at their airports.
Patankar and Holscher (2000) examined the technical and strategic measures that
have been implemented to address the key issues in providing optimum levels of security
without compromising the public’s accessibility to airports. It focuses on the technical
and organizational initiatives implemented in the years since Pan Am Flight 103 disaster
in 1988. Her study examines aviation security in the pre-9/11 era and was published in
2000.
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The methodology that was used included examination of document analysis,
historical research of screening data used and case studies that have been performed in
the past. In addition, reports published by congress and published recommendations to
the FAA were assessed to determine what screening and security initiatives were in place.
The findings show that a variety of screening techniques must be used to provide
reliable security, yet most airports do not apply such techniques. At the time of the study,
security systems at most airports were single-layered. The paper concludes that the
classic law of requisite variety (an intelligent enemy requires an intelligent fortification)
applies to airport security systems. Patankar and Holscher presented a model of aviation
security systems that is believed to provide continuous security and safety. This model
analyses the profiles of passengers on every flight, and then identifies a fixed percentage
of passengers who do not fit the normal profile. They claim that such technique is likely
to provide active threat reduction.
Patankar's and Holscher's model of analyzing profiles of passengers closely
resemble the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) program that
was implemented around the time their study was released in response to the perceived
threat of domestic and international terrorism. Upon booking a flight, identifying
information would be collected by the airline and ran against stored data to determine if
the passenger was a risk to safety. The passenger would be assigned a "risk score" that
could possibly require the person to be subject to additional screening. Additional forms
of passenger screening programs have since been utilized including CAPPS II, Secure
Flight, and various Trusted Traveler programs.
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As a result of TWA Flight 800, President Bill Clinton established the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Chaired by Vice President Al Gore,
the commission was commonly referred to as the "Gore Commission" (Price, 2009). The
most significant finding of the Gore Commission was that the federal government should
considered aviation security to be a national security issue. The commission said that that
aviation security was essentially a government responsibility which was welcomed relief
to the aviation industry. The commission assisted in formulating the Aviation Security
and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 which required airports to conduct threat and
vulnerability assessments every three years at each airport. The act required
fingerprinting and more extensive criminal history checks for all screeners and airport
personnel. The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was
developed that required passengers to input personal information upon buying an airline
ticket that would be used in assessing the individual's threat level. The commission
wanted deployment of explosive detection and explosive trace systems at airports around
the country and sought to expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
According to Szyliowicz (2003) the most dramatic policy change in United States
aviation security was the development of the Department of Homeland Security. The first
steps that took place were the most immediate to prevent further hijackings which
included reinforced cockpit doors and an increase of air marshals on flights. Szyliowicz
(2003) mentions that the most visible change was the implementation of the
Transportation Security Administration, which replaced the passenger screeners that were
employed as screeners. Currently the TSA employs approximately 55,000 federal
workers.
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Public Perception and Privacy
The issue of privacy and security has been a significant debate today in regards to
preserving privacy while ensuring public safety. Chahal (2007) documented the
perceptions of travelers based on the policy and security changes post 9/11. Sixteen
interviews were conducted to collect observations based on the perceptions of travelers at
three airports in the eastern and central United States. Chahal's research also includes the
perceptions of airport personnel of the new aviation guidelines since 9/11.
Chahal (2007) found three main themes in which the perceptions of people in
airports were classified. These categories were: those who feel the new regulations are
necessary updates; those who qualify the necessity of updates; and those who feel that the
new regulation updates are unnecessary. Those who believe the regulation updates are
necessary are frequent flyers that support the new security protocol. Those who qualify
the necessity of the security updates were vacationers who do not travel consistently and,
thus their perspectives are based on their inconvenience, either support or are against the
new protocols. The final group believes the regulations are not necessary. This group
contains people who fly as a last resort and thus do not want to deal with security and the
new protocol involved. Chahal (2007) labels this group as emergency flyers.
It was found that there is a conflict between the issues of public safety and the
preservation of privacy. Observations of the confusion of what is considered public and
what is considered private is discussed. It is concluded that due to the grey area where
private and public overlap, it is difficult to create and sustain a safe environment without
intruding travelers' privacy.
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Drawing upon published research, observations, and analyses of relevant current
and recent trends, Levi and Wall (2004) explore the longer term impact of the postSeptember 11 changes in the security and privacy discourse. Levi compares the privacy
and security reactions of 9/11 between the European Union and the United States.
The results of the study show that the barriers to data sharing between public and
private sectors appear to be lower in the United States than in the European Union. Levi
(2004) states that "probably the most significant impacts of securitization are to be found
in the United States, where the events of September 11 hit the hardest" (p.218). The
European Union countries have only experienced changes in procedures. Not the major
institutional change that the United States experienced. Levi attributes the lack of
European Union change to Europe's prior experiences of terrorism and the agencies that
have been formed prior to 9/11 to combat it domestically. The most pressure for change
has risen from the wanting exchange of air traveler information. Privacy concerns are
more prevalent in the United States because of its more recent direct exposure to
terrorism and the rapid securitization of the country.
Pravone and Esposti (2010) explored the potential technological infringements on
privacy and civil rights due to the enhancement of national security that is intended to
foster proactive attitudes towards crime. Pavone and Esposti (2010) use qualitative data
from focus groups to assess the reasoning of individuals while the trade-off between
privacy and security was tested through an analysis of correlations based on survey data.
This post 9/11 perspective is that a safer society is often pursued through the
implementation of new security policies trying to prevent the materialization of security
threats through increasing reliance on technological devices and data exchange programs
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(Zureik and Hindle, 2004). Pavone states that "Although these technologies constitute a
potential threat to individual privacy, their introduction has been justified in terms of a
beneficial trade-off, whereby the amount of privacy lost is allegedly compensated by an
increase in national and social security." (p.5)
The results of Pavone's study showed that technologies should always be
employed under specific legal and institutional guarantees. Participants in the study
concluded that the introduction of new security technologies should be gradual and
transparent, occur with clear rules and information, should be focused on specific places,
should be proportionate to the danger and the situation, and should affect the privacy of
individuals as little as possible.
Screening Technology and Performance
Although passenger and carry-on baggage screening deters a limited number of
threats, specifically bombing and hijackings, it is still one of the most important security
layers as the majority of attacks on aviation have been bombings of aircraft or hijackings
(Price, 2009). Shanks and Bradley's (2004) Handbook of Checked Baggage Screening
explains the basic screening process in six phases (p.222-223).
1. The divestiture process. The passenger or employee is called by security staff to
remove outer attire and anything that may set off the metal detector, such as belt buckles,
watches, jewelry, coins, mobile phones, or PDAs. These items are placed in a polymer
container and sent through the X-ray machine. Laptops and personal DVD players are
often removed from their containers and placed in separate bins. In the United States,
individuals must also remove their shoes, but this policy changes both from airport to
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airport and country to country. The individual also loads their baggage onto the bag belt
for analysis by the X-ray machine.
2. Passenger screening. The passenger is requested to move through the metal detector.
Passengers who set off the detector's alarm are asked to step aside until a secondary
search can be conducted, usually consisting of a pat-down or hand wand metal detector.
In some instances, passengers may be allowed to go back through the metal detector after
divesting themselves of additional items that may have triggered the alarm, rather than
going to secondary screening.
3. Carry-on baggage screening. As the passenger is being screened, security staff
members analyze the contents of the passenger's bag using conventional X-ray
technology or explosive detection system (EDS) technology. Baggage that contains
questionable items or threat items is often checked physically through a bag search,
analysis of an explosive trace detection (ETD) machine, or in some cases, both. If a bag
contains an apparent bomb, then the screener will likely keep the suspect item within the
X-ray machine, stop the belt to prevent the bag from advancing out of the machine, and
hinder attempts by the owner to pull the bag away from the security staff. The screener
will notify law enforcement and supervisory personnel for further assessment of the Xray image. If the item appears to be a bomb, then an immediate evacuation of the security
screening checkpoint and surrounding area may be required. Explosive demolition teams
or K-9 explosive detection teams are called to further verify the threat.
4. Exit process. Provided passenger belongings have been cleared through the X-ray
analysis, the passengers are reunited with their belongings and allowed to proceed into
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the sterile area. The sterile area is a portion of the terminal area in which travelers have
passed through security.
5. Special circumstances. Disabled passengers and those in wheelchairs often must be
hand searched.
6. Newer technology. New technology is being developed, including explosive trace
portals, liquid explosive detectors, and document scanning devices. These technologies
are being integrated into the passenger and carry-on baggage screening process.
The standard method of screening in the United States is the use of walk through
metal detectors (WTMD) or often called magnetometers. A WTMD creates a magnetic
field which is disrupted by the presence of metal. If the disruption is high enough, an
alarm will sound. The specific level required to sound an alarm can be set depending on
the sensitivity desired. WTMDs only require a second or two to detect metal found on an
individual, so passengers can be quickly processed. Although advancements in
technology have improved some security equipment and led to the development of new
technology and screening processes, the technology and functionality of walk through
metal detectors used at screening checkpoints have remained relatively the same since
their inception in the 1960s. According to Price (2009), more advanced metal detectors
can pinpoint where a metallic object is on an individual. Typically, these advanced
detectors divide the magnetic field into many distinct zones and have uniform coverage
of the entire person. If a metallic object is detected, the zone will be indicated on the exit
side of the detector providing a visual alert of the area where the object is located.
Recent terrorist attacks have been attempted by using liquid explosives. Liquid
explosives often do not contain any metallic objects that would be detected by WTMDs.
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This led to the implementation of Explosive Trace Portals (ETP) that are used for
secondary screening. ETPs are able to detect the presence of explosive material within an
object, such as a bag, or on a person. Backscatter X-ray and millimeter wave imaging
systems have recently been deployed to most major U.S. airports. The imagery produced
is very detailed and shows the body contours of the individual being screened. They
reveal nearly any items that someone may attempt to hide beneath clothing including
guns, knives, drugs, and explosives. Privacy concerns have been raised by many groups
because of the clear and graphic images that are produced by these machines. Millimeter
wave imaging sends radio waves to the individual being screened. The feedback produces
an image of the individual and clearly reveals nonhuman objects such as explosives and
other weapons. The images produced are far less revealing than backscatter but there has
been criticism as to the strength of the radio waves being produced by these machines
and the concern for individual health.
In August 2005, the TSA reported a record number of firearms being confiscated
at airport security checkpoints according to MSNBC. From August 2004 through August
2005 airline travelers surrendered 735 firearms, slightly more than 61 per month. The
previous high was 637 firearms surrendered at airport checkpoints in 2003 (Meeks,
2005). The TSA did not speculate why the sudden increase in confiscated firearms
occurred.
The ultimate success or failure of security relies on the human factor, specifically,
the human screeners that are tasked with detecting abnormalities, risks, and threats. A
study by Wolfe (2010) of the Harvard Medical School in collaboration with the
Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Laboratory examined the
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detection rates of screeners. Thirteen volunteers looked for guns and knives in a softwaregenerated stream of images of suitcases and bags filled with typical items. A stream of
200 bags and suitcases would be observed during each period, followed by a two minute
break. Wolfe performed two tests, one in which a gun or knife was present fifty percent
of the time, and another in which guns or knives appeared two percent of the time.
Observers were told that bags without weapons would be "frequent" in the fifty percent
prevalence condition, and that bags without weapons would be "rare" in the ninety eight
prevalence condition (Wolfe, 2010). Volunteers were told to be as quick and accurate as
possible in correctly identifying bags with weapons.
The results of the study indicated that "target prevalence powerfully influences
visual search behavior" (Wolfe, 2010). In the first experiment, in which people are told to
look for something more common, resulted in them often thinking that they see the
targets even if they are not there. The results of the second experiment in which
participants were told weapons would only appear two percent of the time showed that
when people look for things that are rare, they are not good at finding them. Wolfe (2010)
says that "when targets are rare, observers shift response criteria, leading to elevated miss
error rates" (p.121). Very high target prevalence tests, in which they were told weapons
would be present fifty percent of the time, showed a shift in response criteria in the
opposite direction, leading to elevated false alarms during the baggage search. Falsealarm rates increased substantially at the high-prevalence level, while miss errors
dropped. Wolfe explains:
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"We know that if you don't find it often, you often don't find it. Rare stuff gets
missed. If you look for 20 guns in a stack of 40 bags, you'll find more of them than if you
look for the same 20 guns in a stack of 2,000 bags" (p.124).
Wolfe believes that its an adaptive behavior in nature that can cause problems
when people start looking for rare items like guns in baggage. Wolf suggests that there
are ways to retain airport screeners to reorient their searching skills. He proposes that
error rates may be lowered by offering people in screening positions to simply retrain at
the start of every shift. Wolf speculated that "If [screeners] spend a couple of minutes
doing a simulates search for common weapons, they might then do a better job at really
finding rare ones for the next 30 minutes or so" ( Leggiere, 2010, p.1).
The performance of screeners continues to be a challenge for airport operators and
security officials. Screening both pre and post 9/11 has been harshly criticized for
consistently failing undercover tests performed by government agencies.
Due to long-standing problems with screeners’ performance and congressional
interest in improving this performance, the GAO reviewed the performance of screening
personnel and the efforts being made to improve their performance in a report published
in 2000. The following research questions were presented. Since 1990, how accurately
have screeners been detecting test objects? What are the causes for screeners’
performance problems and what efforts is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
making to address them? How do selected foreign countries handle screening operations
and do they use practices that could help improve screeners’ performance in the US?
The methodology used in assessing the performance of screening personnel and
the efforts being made to improve their performance highlighted by the GAO was the use
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of quantitative research though reviewing relevant literature focusing on the causes of
performance problems and examined past reports on aviation security. To determine the
causes of screener’s performance problems the GOA reviewed FAA documents that
described screening equipment research, development and deployment efforts.
Qualitative research was also performed through interviews with representatives of air
carriers, security companies and two screening equipment manufacturers and two
aviation industry associations to obtain their perspectives on the performance of
screeners. GOA representatives visited Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom to determine how screening operations are handled in other
companies. They met with government and airport officials to discuss the overall
framework for passenger screening.
The GAO (2000) found that no single problem causes checkpoint screeners to fail
to detect dangerous objects. Some of the problems identified included the rapid turnover
among screeners that leaves few experienced personnel at the checkpoints and the
inattention to human factors such as the performance of repetitive tasks and the need for
adequate training in spotting concealed dangerous objects. The major practices and
policies that differed in United States screening from the foreign countries’ screening that
were examined were that in the majority of countries examined, the GOA found that
there was more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, higher pay for
screeners, the differences in screening responsibilities assigned an the more stringent
checkpoint operations, such as routine searches of passengers. Turnover was also
identified as not as significant of a problem in these other countries as it is in the United
States.
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As discussed previously, the opt-out or Screening Partnership Program (SPP) was
a pilot program established by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 to
study the effectiveness of private companies conducting passenger screening, baggage
screening, and inspection (Price, 2009). A 2-year pilot program at five airports testing the
effectiveness of private sector screening in a post-September 11 environment concluded
on November 18, 2004 (GAO, 2004b). The five airports selected for the pilot program
represented different levels of commercial service. These five airports included San
Francisco International Airport, Kansas City International Airport, Greater Rochester
International Airport, Tupelo Regional Airport, and the Jackson Hole Airport. The GAO
assessed the status of the pilot program and TSA’s progress in developing a private
screening program that allows airports to apply to opt out of using federal screeners, later
known as the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). In particular, the GAO assessed
TSA’s efforts to develop policies and procedures for the opt out program, the guidance
TSA has provided to airport operators and private contractors on the plans to develop a
program and information about the program, and TSA’s efforts to develop performance
measures for evaluating the opt-out program and contractor performance.
The methodology used in assessing the effectiveness of private sector screening
by the GAO was the use of qualitative research through conducting in person and
telephone interviews with federal agents and officials from two aviation associations, the
American Association of Airport Executives and the Airports Council International, and
examining documentation from various agencies. Documentation that was examined
including guidance materials from the TSA, independent consulting studies prepared for
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the TSA that evaluated the contract screening pilot program, provisions of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act and other reports addressing the opt-out program.
The GAO found that the TSA have taken steps to communicate information about
the opt out program to stakeholders. TSA has posted an opt-out program application for
airport operators that asks reasons for wanting to participate in the opt-out program and
the preferred timeline for transitioning to private screening operations. However, the
GOA found that some airport operators, private screening contractors, and aviation
industry representatives indicated that they need additional information about leeway in
managing the program, liability protection, and costs relating to the opt-out program. The
most frequent reasons for the lack of interest included that the airport was satisfied with
TSA screening services, screening is a federal government responsibility and the opt-out
program does not allow airports to have managerial control. Liability and contract control
and oversight were also important issues. The TSA has been developing performance
measures both to assess screening performance from airports and from individual
contractors performing screening services. TSA expected to implement contractor-related
performance measures in 2005 along with remaining policies and procedures.
In 2007, the TSA awarded a contract to independent consulting firm Catapult
Consultants to conduct a cost and performance analysis of airports with private screeners
versus airports with federal screeners (GAO, 2009). The contractor used two separate
models to develop its cost analysis. Under the first model, the costs of six SPP airports
were compared with the costs of six comparable non-SPP airports. Under their second
model, they used data from approximately 450 airports to compare costs for each of the
six SPP airports to a regression-based model. for a fully federal operation at the same
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SPP airport. A regression-based model was used to determine what the SPP airport
would cost if it used federal screeners.
According to the TSA, the contractor concluded that the SPP airports have
historically cost more to operate, with the two models averaging anywhere from 9 to 17
percent higher costs than if the airports were to use federal screeners (GAO, 2009). When
analyzing the performance of screeners, the contractor used four measures including (1)
threat image projection detection rates (2) recertification pass rate (3) wait times and (4)
customer satisfaction. They examined four years of performance data from 2004 to 2007.
The contractor's analysis found that SPP airports' overall performance results are equal to
or better than those delivered by non-SPP airports. The results of the study were to be
used by senior TSA leadership for making strategic decisions about the state and future of
the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). The official report of the study performed by
Catapult Consultants were never released to the public.
In 2009, the TSA issued their official report comparing the cost and performance
of screening at SPP and non-SPP airports. The TSA compared the cost of operating
screening at SPP airports with the cost that would be incurred in the agency's budget if
these airports were run as fully federal airports. Screening data was then obtained and ran
against the six SPP airports and six non-SPP airports.
Invoice data obtained from six SPP airports was used to determine cost. The six
SPP airports included Greater Rochester International Airport, Jackson Hole Airport, Joe
Foss Field, Kansas City International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and
Tupelo Regional Airport. The TSA then chose six non-SPP airports of the same airport
category (category X, I, II, III, and IV) which included Barkley Regional Airport, Central

24

Illinois Regional, Logan International Airport, Missoula International Airport, Salt Lake
City International Airport and Syracruse-Hancock International Airport.
The TSA analyzed the 2007 performance data for five performance measures
including (1) threat image projection detection rates (2) recertification (3) passenger
waiting (4) peak wait times and (5) checkpoint capacity utilization. The TSA concluded
that screening at SPP airports cost approximately 17.4 percent more to operate than
airports with federal screeners and that SPP airports fell within the "average performer"
category for performance measures (GAO, 2008). An airport was considered an average
performer if the results of the performance measures fell within one standard deviation
from the airport category average.
This conclusion came under scrutiny from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) as the TSA failed to include several costs. According to a March 2011 report
published by the GAO:
"We reported in January 2009, among other things, that TSA had underestimated
costs to the government for screeners at non-SPP airports because the agency did not
include all of the costs associated with passenger and baggage screening services at these
airports, such as workers’ compensation and general liability insurance, and certain
retirement benefits to be paid by the Office of Personnel Management to TSA retirees at
non-SPP airports. Further, TSA did not reflect the revenue received by the government
from corporate income taxes paid by SPP contractors. The omission of these factors
reduced the reliability of TSA’s 2009 cost estimate by increasing the costs for privatecontractor screeners relative to federal screeners" (p.3).
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The GAO performed work with the TSA from September 2010 through February
2011 to address three of the seven cost limitations previously outlined. These cost
limitations included the cost impact of overlapping administrative personnel, some fringe
benefits, and cost comparisons for multiple fiscal years. In the March 2011 updated
report, the TSA's new estimation is that the SPP airports would cost 3 percent more to
operate in 2011 than airports using federal screeners. This was a significant decrease
from their initial report of 17.4 percent in 2009. The TSA has generally addressed 3 of 4
cost limitations but needs to take additional actions to address the remaining 4 limitations
related to cost and the 3 limitations related to performance (GAO, 2011).
Three common themes were found that relate to topic of civilian aviation security
screening. One theme entailed how federal regulations and policies from both the federal
government and private security organizations have impacted aviation screening. A
second theme was the way in which the public's perception of civilian aviation screening
has transformed over time. Screening technology and performance is a third theme that
has greatly impacted aviation security. All three of these themes can interact with each
other. Increased regulation has led to the development of new policies and technology
that have impacted both the screening technology and the screening process. The
advancement of screening technology has led to concerns over personal privacy.

26

Chapter 3

Methodology
Context of the Study
The criticism of the level of security and violations of personal privacy remain to
be major issues confronted by the TSA. Several issued reports show the failure of
undercover security tests at checkpoints where TSA personnel failed to detect explosive
devices, guns, and other weapons (GAO, 2007). Billions in taxpayer money have been
spent since the government takeover of aviation screening. Questions remain as to
whether the government takeover of screening services has improved security over its
private counterparts prior to 9/11. This study probed if the federalization of the aviation
screening process had any effect on the rate of confiscated weapons at airport screening
checkpoints.
Research Hypothesis
The hypothesis is that airport screening firearms confiscations (per one million
screenings) were lower before the U.S. government (TSA) took over screening in 20012002.
Data Collection
Data collected from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided for a
statistical analysis of confiscated firearms intercepted at airport screening/check points
pre and post 9/11. The screening process prior to September 2001 was conducted by the
private sector. After September 2001, the entire screening process was transferred over to
the TSA. A rate was generated from the FAA’s data that will provide a descriptive
comparison of the number of firearms confiscated and the number of people screened
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each year. A broad and extensive scope of sources were utilized in conducting this
research to assist in forming clear and concise results. Existing research from academia,
information from government reports, and data retrieved from various government
agencies were also used in this study. Public records and publications from organizations,
government agencies, and persons were examined. Data collected from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) provided for a descriptive analysis of confiscated
firearms intercepted at airport screening check points.
Application of Time-Series Analysis
Celik, Corbacioglu, and Gumus (2008) performed a public policy analysis of gun
control and crime. The study probed if the 1982 Chicago Gun Ordinance made any
significant impact on violent crimes such as homicide and aggravated assault committed
with firearms by using annual data between 1973 and 1999. Data was obtained from the
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics, FBI uniform crime reports, and the
Chicago Police Department for the city of Chicago. The study used Auto Regressive
Moving Average time-series analysis along with a control group time-series analysis for
the U.S. national level data.
The results of the study indicated that the policy decreased the homicide rates,
although it was abrupt and only temporary. After the very first year, the policy affecting
homicide rates was not statistically significant. The policy also did not decrease the
aggravated assault crime at all after intervention. Celik's, Corbacioglu's, and Gumus's
(2008) results indicate that the intervention year's significant negative effect on homicide
rate is probably due to some other factors.
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Data Analysis
This quantitative research required the performance of an interrupted time series
analysis. A time series is a sequence of observations taken at evenly spaced time intervals
(Yin, 2003). Time series analysis involves looking for patterns that will help us
understand what is happening with the data (Berk, 2004). Interrupted time series analysis
evaluates the impact of one or more events on the values in the time series. Within the
same single case study, two different patterns of events may be hypothesized over time
(Yin, 2003). Campbell (1969) utilized time series analysis in his study of the Connecticut
speed limit law. One time-series pattern was based on the proposition that a new law (an
interruption in the time series) had substantially reduced the number of fatalities, whereas
the other time series pattern was based on the proposition that no such effect had
occurred. Campbell's examination of the actual data points (the annual number of
fatalities over a period of years) was used to determine which of the proposed time series
patterns best matched the evidence.
An interrupted time series analysis attempts to determine whether an outside
event affected subsequent observations. For an example, did the implementation of a new
economic policy improve economic performance, did a new gun ordinance reduce violent
crimes; or in this study, did the government takeover of airport screening increase the
number of confiscated firearms. Such comparison of an "interrupted time series" within
the same case has been applied to this study of firearm confiscations at airport
checkpoints.
Although wanting to utilize data from all confiscations at airport screening
checkpoints, this data is not available due to many factors. Before 2001, screening
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services were used for the detection of metal objects. The FAA collected data on
firearms, explosive and incendiary devices, and ‘other dangerous articles'. Firearms were
divided into two subsections; handguns and long guns. The Office of Civil Aviation
Security Policy and Planning discontinued keeping records of "other dangerous articles"
in 1992 and explosive/incendiary devices recordkeeping was discontinued in 1994 due to
inconsistent reporting (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2001).
Records of some intercepted items at airport screening checkpoints are not
available for 2001 due to the inconsistent data most likely was contributed by the
transition from private screeners to government screeners (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, 2001). Beginning in 2002, prohibited items began to include knives, box
cutters, "other cutting instruments" clubs, and "other" in addition to firearms and
incendiaries. As of August 8, 2008, the TSA stopped the collection of data on all
prohibited items except for firearms and incendiaries (Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
2011).
Fluctuations in counts of prohibited categories can be attributed to changes in
definitions and regulations governing prohibited items. Between 2005 and 2007 there was
a large increase and then decrease of prohibited items due to the prohibition of lighters on
board between April 2005 and August 2007 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2011).
Due to changes in definitions and regulations governing prohibited items over the last 30
years, the only consistent category of prohibited and confiscated items is firearms.
The FAA defines firearms as any weapon that is designed to or may readily be
converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, as well as spear guns, BB
guns, flare pistols, compressed air guns, and stunning devices. It is important to keep in
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mind that the airport screening checkpoint refers to the area in which passengers passed
through with their carry-on baggage.
Prior to 2001, the general public was allowed into the terminal area as long as
they passed through screening checkpoints. After 2001, only ticketed passengers were
allowed into the terminal (sterile) area by passing through screening checkpoints. It is
expected that the number of persons screened will be higher in the data collected before
2001 in comparison to the data of persons screened after 2001 due to the general public
passing through security in addition to ticketed passengers. Following 2001, the persons
screened included only enplanements or ticketed passengers in addition to a very small
number of airport employees. Fortunately, this study looks at all persons screened and the
number of firearms confiscated regardless of whether the person screened is a ticketed
passenger or not.
Because the TSA was created in November 2001 but not fully implemented until
November 2002, the 2001 and 2002 data of persons screened and confiscated firearms
cannot be used due to this period of transition in which there was a presence of both TSA
and private screeners in our nation's airports. Therefore, there are two data sets. The first
data set includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from years 1990 through
2000. The second set of data includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from
years 2003 through 2009. The total data that will be used spans a twenty year period
(1990-2009).
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Assumptions
It is assumed that the statistical and descriptive data retrieved from government
reports including reports published by the FAA, TSA, and GAO is factual, nonpartisan,
non-ideological, fair and accurate. Prior research used in this study is assumed to be
truthful and accurate.
Limitations
Due to the numerous changes in what is defined as a prohibited and/or confiscated
item as outlined by the FAA and TSA, there are inconsistencies in recordkeeping. There
is very little information on screeners detecting prohibited items, as the federal
government has classified the performance of both its screening workforce and detection
equipment. The findings of this research may not be applicable to all airports.
Subjectivities or Bias
Having exposure and experience in both private sector and public sector security
led me to explore my interest in differences between the two. This study originated as a
study of the effectiveness between private and public security. This interest transformed
into investigating the "poster child" of an industry's experience with both private and
public security, the aviation industry. Civilian aviation screening is unique in that it
transitioned from a private-performed operation to a government-performed operation in
roughly one year. This is the single largest security transformation in the United States
and has affected nearly everyone who has traveled. My curiosity to explore this issue has
led me to the research at hand. By understanding and keeping my subjectivities in check,
I researched this critical issue and provided objective information that can be used to
positively impact aviation security.

32

Chapter 4

Research Findings and Analysis
Two groups of data represent the private and federal screening utilized over a
twenty year span. Because the TSA was created in November 2001 but not fully
implemented until November 2002, the 2001 and 2002 data of persons screened and
confiscated firearms cannot be used due to this period of transition in which there was a
presence of both federal (TSA) and private screeners in our nation's airports. Therefore,
there are two data sets. The first data set includes persons screened and firearms
confiscated from years 1990 through 2000 when private screeners were utilized. The
second set of data includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from years 2003
through 2009 when federal screeners were utilized. The total data that will be used spans
a twenty year period (1990-2009). Table 1 provides a visual representation of the two
data groups.
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Table 1.
Groups of Data
Years
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Firearms
Persons Screened
Confiscated
2,549
1,145,000,000
1,644
1,015,000,000
2,608
1,111,000,000
2,798
1,150,000,000
2,994
1,261,000,000
2,390
1,263,000,000
2,155
1,497,000,000
2,067
1,660,000,000
1,515
1,667,000,000
1,552
1,767,000,000
1,937
1,812,000,000
2001 & 2002 Screening Transition
from Private to Federal. Data is
excluded from study.
683
650,808,785
650
706,424,048
2,217
737,186,789
2,075
739,308,556
1,416
763,505,561
902
736,470,443
889
697,998,338

Group 1 (1990-2000)
Private Screening Svc.

Group 2 (2003-2009)
Federal Screening Svc.

Source(s): Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) (2001). Bureau
of Transportation Statistics: Table 2-16: Airline Passenger Screening Results by
Type of Weapons Detected, Persons Arrested, and Bomb Threats Received.
Retrieved March 17, 2011 from http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/2003/html/table_02_16.html
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) (2010). Bureau
of Transportation Statistics: Table 2-16: Prohibited Items Intercepted at Airport
Screening Checkpoints. Retrieved March 15, 2011 from http://www.bts.gov/
publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_16.html.
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Rate of Firearm Confiscations Per One Million Persons
A rate of persons screened and firearms confiscated was formulated that was used
to compare each set of data. Due to the number of screened passengers being in the
billions prior to 2001 and in the hundreds of millions after 2002, a rate of firearms
confiscated per one million persons screened was calculated. To calculate this rate, the
population (persons screened) was divided by one million to get "X." This means that
there are X "groups" of one million persons screened in that population. The number of
firearms confiscated was then be divided by X resulting in the number of firearms
confiscated per one million persons. Below is a visual representation of the calculation.
Firearms Confiscated ÷ (Persons Screened ÷ 1,000,000) = Firearms Confiscated per One
Million Persons
1990 Data:
2,549/(1,145,000,000/1,000,000) = 2.23 Firearms Confiscated per One Million Persons
Calculation breakdown:
1,145,000,000/1,000,000 = 1,145
2,549/1,145 = 2.23 Firearms Confiscated per One Million Persons
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This calculation was performed for each year included in this study as exhibited in Table
2.
Table 2.
Firearms Confiscated per One Million Persons
Years
Firearms
Persons Screened
Confiscated
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Firearms per
1,000,000
Persons
2,549
1,145,000,000
2.23
1,644
1,015,000,000
1.62
2,608
1,111,000,000
2.35
2,798
1,150,000,000
2.43
2,994
1,261,000,000
2.37
2,390
1,263,000,000
1.89
2,155
1,497,000,000
1.44
2,067
1,660,000,000
1.25
1,515
1,667,000,000
0.91
1,552
1,767,000,000
0.88
1,937
1,812,000,000
1.07
2001 & 2002 Screening Transition from Private to
Federal. Data is excluded from study.
683
650,808,785
1.05
650
706,424,048
0.92
2,217
737,186,789
3.01
2,075
739,308,556
2.81
1,416
763,505,561
1.85
902
736,470,443
1.22
889
697,998,338
1.27

Source(s): Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) (2001). Bureau
of Transportation Statistics: Table 2-16: Airline Passenger Screening Results by
Type of Weapons Detected, Persons Arrested, and Bomb Threats Received.
Retrieved March 17, 2011 from http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/2003/html/table_02_16.html
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) (2010). Bureau
of Transportation Statistics: Table 2-16: Prohibited Items Intercepted at Airport
Screening Checkpoints. Retrieved March 15, 2011 from http://www.bts.gov/
publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_16.html.
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Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the rate of firearms confiscated per
one million screened plotted against time. The data thus far will be plotted against time to
show trends, patterns, and outliers in firearm confiscations per million.
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Figure 1. Rate of Firearms Confiscated Per One Million Screened
A noteworthy trend is the steady decrease in the rate of confiscated firearms from
1994 until 1999. This trend is within the first group of data when private screening
services were being utilized. A startling observation is the sudden increase in firearm
confiscations in 2005. Confiscations in 2006 dip slightly before lowering significantly in
2007 and even further in 2008. Confiscation levels in 2008 and 2009 using TSA
screeners are at comparable levels to years 1998 – 2000 when private screeners were
used. According to this graph, it is apparent that there is a significant difference in the
rate of confiscations following the federalization of security screening. A time series
analysis was conducted to test this observation.
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Firearms Confiscated Averages
Descriptive statistics of the data were formulated to provide an in-depth analysis.
The averages of the firearms confiscated per one million screened were found next. The
average for all years (1990 through 2009, excluding 2001 and 2002) can be found by
adding all eighteen years of firearms confiscated per one million persons together and
dividing the sum by eighteen (eighteen total years of data). This calculation was
performed as followed:
30.57 ÷ 18 = 1.70 Total Average Confiscated Firearms per million for 1990-2009
(Excluding 2001 & 2002).
Group 1 Average.
The average of the firearms confiscated per million screened for the first set of data
(1990-2000) was found by adding the first eleven years together and dividing the sum by
eleven (11 years of data). This calculation was performed as followed:
18.43 ÷ 11 = 1.68 Total Average Confiscated Firearms per million for Group 1 (19902000).
Group 2 Average.
The average of the firearms confiscated per million screened for the second set of data
(2003-2009) was found by adding the last seven years together and dividing the sum by
seven (7 years of data). This calculation was performed as followed:
12.14 ÷ 7 = 1.73 Total Average Confiscated Firearms per million for Group 2 (20032009).
The above calculations give us the averages of the data in three groups: total
averages of all data (1990 through 2009, excluding 2001 and 2002), total averages of data
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1990 through 2000, total averages of data 2003 through 2009. Table 3 and 4 provide a
visual representation of the average number of confiscations for each group.
Table 3
Average Confiscated Firearms by Year
Group 1
Years
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Group 2

Firearms per
1,000,000
Persons
2.23
1.62
2.35
2.43
2.37
1.89
1.44
1.25
0.91
0.88
1.07

Years
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Table 4
Average Confiscated Firearms by Group
Group
Total Data Points
All Years (1990-2009
18
excluding 2001 & 2002):
Group 1 Totals:
11
Group 2 Totals:
7

Firearms per
1,000,000
Persons
1.05
0.92
3.01
2.81
1.85
1.22
1.27

Averages
1.70
1.68
1.73

Yearly Change in Confiscated Firearms
Determining the yearly change in confiscated firearms is useful in determining if
any trends exist or any possible outliers. To analyze change in the rate of confiscated
firearms, the difference from year to year was calculated. This calculation was found by
subtracting the current year from the preceding year; meaning Year 2 is subtracted from
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Year 1. This calculation was performed for each year included in this study. Below is an
example:
1991 rate of firearms confiscated per one million screened - 1990 rate of confiscated
firearms per million = The rate change from 1990 to 1991.
1.62 - 2.23 = -0.61 Confiscated Firearms per Million.
Table 5 provides a visual representation of the yearly change of confiscated firearms per
million for each data set.
Table 5
Yearly Change of Confiscated Firearms
Per Million
Years
Firearms per
Diff. Per Year
1,000,000
Persons
1990
2.23
1991
1.62
-0.61
1992
2.35
0.73
1993
2.43
0.09
1994
2.37
-0.06
1995
1.89
-0.48
1996
1.44
-0.45
1997
1.25
-0.19
1998
0.91
-0.34
1999
0.88
-0.03
2000
1.07
0.19
2001
2001 and 2002 Data Excluded
2002
2003
1.05
-0.39
2004
0.92
-0.13
2005
3.01
2.09
2006
2.81
-0.20
2007
1.85
-0.95
2008
1.22
-0.63
2009
1.27
0.05
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When the yearly change of confiscated firearms per million is graphed against
time, it allows us to provide a visual that is used to determine if any possible trends of
outliers exist. Figure 2 displays this information.
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Figure 2. Yearly Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million
When observing Graph 2, one possible outlier appears to be the difference from year
2004 to 2005. This significant change appears to be an anomaly as there is no justifiable
reason for why this occurred.
Percentage Change in Confiscated Firearms
It is useful to determine the percentage change of the yearly rate of confiscated
firearms. Determining the percentage change from year to year provides the reader with a
better picture of any possible trends or major outliers. This was done by utilizing the
results from the previous calculation. This calculation was performed by taking the
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change in rate or difference per year of confiscated firearms divided by the same year's
rate of confiscated firearms per million multiplied by one hundred.
Example:
(Confiscated Firearms Rate Change from 1990 to 1991 / 1990 Rate of Confiscated
Firearms Per Million) x 100 = Percentage Change to the Following Year
(-0.61/ 2.23) x 100 = -27.35% change from 1990 to 1991
Table 6 provides a visual representation of the yearly percentage change of confiscated
firearms per million for each data set.
Table 6
Yearly Percentage Change of Confiscated Firearms Per
Million
Years
Firearms Per
Difference Per
Percentage
1,000,000
Year*
Difference Per
Persons*
Year*
1990
2.23
1991
1.62
-0.61
-27.24
1992
2.35
0.73
44.93
1993
2.43
0.09
3.65
1994
2.37
-0.06
-2.41
1995
1.89
-0.48
-20.30
1996
1.44
-0.45
-23.93
1997
1.25
-0.19
-13.50
1998
0.91
-0.34
-27.01
1999
0.88
-0.03
-3.36
2000
1.07
0.19
21.71
2001
0.81
-0.26
-24.10
2002
1.44
0.63
77.47
2003
1.05
-0.39
-27.12
2004
0.92
-0.13
-12.32
2005
3.01
2.09
226.84
2006
2.81
-0.20
-6.67
2007
1.85
-0.95
-33.92
2008
1.22
-0.63
-33.96
2009
1.27
0.05
3.99
* Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
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Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the percentage difference per year of
confiscated firearms per million for each data set.
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Figure 3. Yearly Percentage Change of Confiscated Firearms Per Million
Hypothesis Test
The null hypothesis is often rejected when the p-value is less than or equal to the
significance level. When the null hypothesis is rejected, the result is statistically
significant. A result is considered statistically significant if it is unlikely to have occurred
by chance. Results that are statistically insignificant mean the results are likely to be due
to chance.
A null hypothesis is used in statistics that proposes that no statistical significance
exists in a set of given observations. If the results of the test equal zero, there is no
significant difference found between the first group of data (1990-2000 firearm
confiscations per million) and second group of data (2002-2009 firearms confiscated per
million).
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The null hypothesis is as follows:
H0: u1 - u2 = 0
If the results are less than zero then this indicates that confiscations before the
government takeover were lower.
H1: u1 - u2 < 0
Degrees of Freedom
The degrees of freedom is the number of independent pieces of data that are used
to make a calculation. The degrees of freedom were calculated by taking the total units
and subtracting the number of groups of data.
(N1 + N2) - Number of Groups = Degrees of Freedom
(11 + 7) - 2 = 16
Degrees of freedom = 16
Critical Value
The critical value represents a number that must be achieved in order to
demonstrate statistical significance. The critical value was obtained from a t-Distribution
Probability Table using a one-tailed test at a significance level of 0.05 and the number of
degrees of freedom (16). A significance level of 0.05 is used because it is universally
accepted as the value for statistical significance. From the t-Distribution Probability
Table we can see that the critical value is 1.746.
Determining Variance
Variance states how close together the numbers in a group are. The variance was found
for both groups of data (Group 1 and Group 2). The following is the formula for variance:
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X-line is the average for the group of data.
n is the sample size for the group.
means that every number in the group must be subtracted by the average for
the data set.
The resulting figures must then be squared before being added together.
The sum of squared numbers will then be divided by (n-1)
The following formula was used to calculate the variance ("s") that will later be used in
the t-test.
s2 =

(N1 - 1)(S1) 2 + (N2 - 1)(S2) 2
N1 + N2 - 2

Group 1 (1990-2000) is the years when private screening services were utilized.
N1 is the number of years in the Group 1 data set; 11.
Y1 is the average firearms confiscated per million for first data set (1990 through 2000);
1.68. This was determined earlier in the Firearm Confiscations for Group 1 section.
S1 is the variance for the first data set of firearms confiscated per million
Years following the government take over include 2003-2009
N2 is the number of years following the government takeover
Y2 is the average firearms confiscated per million for second data set (2003 through
2009)
S2 is the variance for the second data set of firearms confiscated per million
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T-Test Calculation
The results in the above calculations were utilized to conduct a t-test. A t-test
assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically significant from each other.
The T-test tested my hypothesis of airport screening firearm confiscations per one million
screenings were lower before the U.S. government (TSA) took over screening in 20012002.
s2 =

(N1 - 1)(S1) 2 + (N2 - 1)(S2) 2
N1 + N2 - 2

Years prior to the government takeover include 1990-2000.
N1 is the number of years prior to government takeover
Y1 is the average firearms confiscated per million for first data set (1990 through 2000)
S1 is the variance for the first data set of firearms confiscated per million
Years following the government take over include 2003-2009
N2 is the number of years following the government takeover
Y2 is the average firearms confiscated per million for second data set (2003 through
2009)
S2 is the variance for the second data set of firearms confiscated per million
The formula below was used to calculate the variance ("s") is later used in the t-value test
statistic.
s=

(11 - 1)(0.370) 2 + (7 - 1)(0.731) 2
11 + 7 - 2

s = 0.5347
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T-Value Test Statistic
T-Value:

Y1 - Y2
s (1/N1) + (1/N2)

Y1 is the average firearms confiscated per million for first data set (1990 through 2000)
Y2 is the average firearms confiscated per million for second data set (2003 through
2009)
N1 is the number of years prior to government takeover
N2 is the number of years following the government takeover
s is the variance (0.5347).
T-Value:

1.68 - 1.73
s (1/11) + (1/7)

T-Value:

-0.05
0.258

T-Value:

-0.194

Since the critical value equals 1.746 and the test statistic is lower (-0.194), we
cannot reject the null hypothesis (Ho). Since we do not reject the null hypothesis (H0) we
assume H0: u1 - u2 = 0. This means the two samples come from a population with the
same mean (u). Since the samples have the same mean (u), this means there are no
differences between the two sets of data since the results are significant at 0.05. This
means, according to the results of the t-test, there is no significant difference between the
number of firearm confiscations by private screeners and the number of firearms
confiscated by government screeners. This indicates that the transition from private to
public screeners has had no statistically significant effect on the number of firearm
confiscations.
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To be able to further understand the results of this study, it is necessary to
examine the theoretical screening process models used by the private sector before 9/11
and by the TSA after 9/11. Two models have been developed that depict security
checkpoint screening for weapons. The first model is a depiction of security checkpoint
screening used in 2001 when screening services were conducted by private organizations.
The second model is a depiction of the current security checkpoint screening model used
by the Transportation Security Administration.
2001 Theoretical Screening Process Model (Private Screening Model)
Prior to the federalization of security screening, screening was the responsibility
of individual airlines and aircraft operators. Security screening was usually subcontracted
to an approved vendor, often by selecting the lowest bid. The general public along with
passengers were allowed into the terminal area as long as they passed through screening
checkpoints. A passenger's travel documentation was checked at their departing gate by
airline staff. Figure 4 illustrates the screening processes that takes place from when an
individual makes a flight reservation to when they pass through security checkpoint
screening.
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Figure 4. 2001 Screening process passenger flow prior to federalization.
Source(s): GlobalSecurity.org (2007). Homeland Security: Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening Program. Retrieved from March 3, 2012 from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/cappsii.htm
The theoretical process model used in the 2001 checkpoint screening of passengers and
accessible property (Private Screening Process Model) is broken into several phases.
Each phase is explained in detail.
1. The individual loads their belongings onto the conveyer for analysis by an X-ray
machine.
2. The individual is requested to move through a walk through metal detector (WTMD).
A WTMD creates a magnetic field which is disrupted by the presence of metal. If the
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disruption is high enough, an alarm will sound. Individuals who set off the detector's
alarm are asked to step aside until a secondary search can be conducted, usually
consisting of a hand wand or hand held metal detector (HHMD). In some instances,
individuals may be allowed to go back through the metal detector after divesting
themselves of additional items that may have triggered the alarm, rather than going to
secondary screening. Individuals in wheel chairs or with casts and prosthetic devices
were screened via the hand wand metal detector were subject to pat downs.
3. As the individual is being screened, security staff members analyze the contents of the
individual's bag and belongings using conventional X-ray technology.
4. Baggage that contains questionable items or threat items is often checked physically
through a bag search, analysis of an explosive trace detection (ETD) machine, or in some
cases, both. If a bag contains an apparent bomb, then the screener would keep the suspect
item within the X-ray machine, stop the belt to prevent the bag from advancing out of the
machine, and hinder attempts by the owner to pull the bag away from the security staff.
The screener will notify law enforcement and supervisory personnel for further
assessment of the X-ray image.
5. Exit process. Provided that the belongings have been cleared through the X-ray
analysis, individuals are reunited with their belongings and allowed to proceed into the
terminal(s).
This process is depicted graphically in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Theoretical process model used in the 2001 checkpoint screening of passengers
and accessible property (Private Screening Process Model).
Source(s): Transport Canada (2006). CATSA's Mandate: Chapter 3: Multi-stage Process
for Pre-board Screening. Retrieved March 20, 2012 from http://www.tc.gc
.ca/tcss/catsa/final_report-rapport_final/chapter3_e.htm
Prohibited items were limited to explosive and incendiary devices, firearms, and
knives four inches or longer in length. FAA policy allowed passengers to carry knives
that were shorter than 4 inches onboard. It was assumed that individuals attempting to
conceal a bomb would be deterred by the WTMD. The belief was that metal detectors
would always detect metal components within the bomb. It was assumed that an
individual attempting to conceal a bomb in their baggage would be detected by the X-ray
operator. Conventional X-ray machines used at the time did not have the capabilities to
detect trace explosive material. Explosive detection system technology and explosive
trace detection technology was deployed to the nation's commercial airports with the
intent of using them on travelers who were selected under the Computer-Assisted
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Passenger Profiling Program (CAPPS) or were selected for secondary screening. These
machines were rarely used as few individuals were flagged under the CAPPS program.
Current Theoretical Screening Process Model (TSA Screening Model)
The Department of Homeland Security currently utilizes 20 layers of screening in
its aviation security model (Figure 6). These 20 layers can be grouped into categories
based on location in the security process. According to Feltcher (2011), categories
include 1) intelligence; 2)
checkpoint screening of passengers
and accessible property; 3) checkedbaggage screening; 4) random
security measures; and 5) security
measures on board the aircraft.
Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR)
teams are comprised of federal air
marshals, surface transportation
security inspectors, transportation
security officers, behavior detection
officers and explosives detection
canine teams. According to the TSA,

Figure 6. Layers of U.S. Aviation Security
Source(s): Transportation Security
Administration (2012). Layers of
Security. Retrieved March 15, 2012
from http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/
layers/index.shtm
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VIPR teams work with local security
and law enforcement officials to
supplement existing security

resources, provide deterrent presence and detection capabilities, and introduce an element
of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning activities. VIPR teams are
typically involved in rail sector and ferry operations to provide additional security.
Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO) utilize behavioral observation and
techniques to analyze and identify potentially high risk passengers. BDOs screen
travelers for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people exhibit in
response to a fear of being discovered.
TSA's Secure Flight program encompasses multiple layers of security screening.
Specifically in the pre-screening areas. Secure Flight requires passengers to provide
certain personal information during the flight reservation process. This information is ran
against existing No-Fly lists and other data systems to identify suspected terrorists. This
information is then used by TSA and law enforcement to facilitate the travel of legitimate
passengers and enhance security for suspect individuals.
Federal Air Marshals is a system that has been in place since 1962 that is
composed of Federal law enforcement officers under the TSA. Air Marshals deploy
onboard select flights to detect, deter and defeat hostile acts while blending in with other
passengers.
The Federal Flight Deck Officer program authorizes eligible flight crewmembers
to use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence if an attempt is made to take
control of an aircraft. Authorization by the TSA is given to select pilots and flight
engineers and these personnel are trained by the Federal Air Marshal Service.
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Airport screening checkpoints operated by Transportation Security Officers are
the one layer that is commonly associated with the TSA because of its visibility to the
public. Due to this study's focus on firearm confiscations at passenger screening
checkpoints, the theoretical model used for the checkpoint screening of passengers and
accessible property layer of screening will be examined. After 2001, only ticketed
passengers were allowed into the sterile (terminal) area by passing through screening
checkpoints. The various security measures used in the current model to screen
passengers and their property are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Current Screening Process Model (TSA Screening Model).
Source(s): Fletcher, Kenneth C. (2011). Aviation Security: A Case for Risk-Based
Passenger Screening. (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).
Retrieved from http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/
11Dec_Fletcher.pdf
The theoretical process model used in the current checkpoint screening of passengers and
accessible property is broken into several phases. Each phase is explained in detail.
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1. Travel Document Checking Station. Travel Document Checkers position in front of the
checkpoint to check passengers' boarding identification. This was a responsibility was
assumed by TSA from airline contractors. This layer discovers suspect, illegal or expired
documents, passports, visas, and drivers licenses.
2. The passenger or employee is called by security staff to remove outer attire and
anything that may set off the metal detector, such as belt buckles, watches, jewelry, coins,
mobile phones, or PDAs. These items are placed in a polymer container and sent through
the X-ray machine. Laptop computers and personal DVD players are removed from their
containers and placed in separate bins. Liquids and gels must be removed from baggage
to provide an unobstructed view of the contents. Individuals must also remove their
shoes. The individual also loads their baggage onto the conveyer for analysis by the Xray machine.
3. The passenger is requested to move through a walk through metal detector (WTMD).
A WTMD creates a magnetic field which is disrupted by the presence of metal. If the
disruption is high enough, an alarm will sound. Passengers who set off the detector's
alarm are asked to step aside until a secondary search can be conducted, usually
consisting of a pat-down or hand wand metal detector. In some instances, passengers may
be allowed to go back through the metal detector after divesting themselves of additional
items that may have triggered the alarm.
4. The passenger is moved into an Advanced Imaging Technology(AIT) device.
Typically, these are whole body imaging millimeter wave portals that scan the body for
both metallic and non-metallic items. The most noticeable and most controversial
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screening technology is the use of Advanced Imaging Technology. TSA began deploying
AIT in airports around the country in 2007. Two types of imaging technology are used;
millimeter wave and backscatter. Backscatter technology projects X-rays over the body to
create a reflection of the body displayed on a monitor. Images are viewed in a remote
location. The imagery produced is very detailed and shows the body contours of the
individual being screened. Millimeter wave technology sends electromagnetic waves to
through the scanner. When the waves reflect off of the person inside the unit, an image is
projected on a screen. Potential threats are highlighted on a generic outline of a person for
every passenger on a screen immediately outside of the device. This eliminates the need
for officers to remotely view images. Passengers selected for AIT screening who object
to proceeding through this screening will be subject to equivalent alternative screening
including physical pat down.
3. Carry-on baggage screening. As the passenger is being screened, security staff
members analyze the contents of the passenger's belongings using conventional X-ray
technology or explosive detection system (EDS) technology. Baggage that contains
questionable items or threat items is often checked physically through a bag search,
analysis of an explosive trace detection (ETD) machine, or in some cases, both. If a bag
contains an apparent bomb, then the screener will likely keep the suspect item within the
X-ray machine, stop the belt to prevent the bag from advancing out of the machine, and
hinder attempts by the owner to pull the bag away from the security staff. The screener
will notify law enforcement and supervisory personnel for further assessment of the Xray image.
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4. Exit process. Provided passenger belongings have been cleared through the X-ray
analysis, the passengers are reunited with their belongings and allowed to proceed into
the sterile area.
5. Special circumstances. Disabled passengers and those in wheelchairs often must be
hand searched. Cast Scopes are used for screening casts and prosthetic devices to ensure
they are not concealing weapons or explosives. Bottle liquids scanner (BLS) screening
systems are used by TSA agents to detect liquids or gels that may be a threat to security.
BLSs are used primarily to screen medically necessary liquids in quantities larger than
three ounces.
This process is depicted graphically in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Current screening checkpoint process model of passengers and accessible
property (TSA Screening Process Model).
Source(s): Transportation Security Administration (2012) Checkpoint Evolution.
Retrieved March 13, 2012 fromhttp://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/
index.shtm
57

The list of prohibited items grew exponentially since the federalization of security
checkpoint screening. Sharp objects, sporting goods, guns and firearms, tools, martial arts
and self defense items, explosive and flammable materials, chemicals and several other
items have been prohibited with few exceptions. The most significant change was the
limitation on liquids and gels to 3.4 ounces or less and may have no more than what will
fit in a quart size clear plastic bag.
Theoretical Process Model Comparative Analysis
The more significant changes between the two theoretical models are the increase
in types of prohibited items and advancement of security technology used for the
detection of potential explosive or incendiary devices. Upon examination of both
theoretical screening process models it becomes apparent as to why the data has shown
there is no significant difference in firearm confiscations. The processes utilized in
screening for firearms are nearly identical between the private and public models. The
two primary screening technologies used to screen for firearms are walk through metal
detectors and the use of x-ray machines for screening carry-on baggage. The standard
method of screening in the United States is the use of walk through metal detectors
(WTMD) or often called magnetometers. A WTMD creates a magnetic field which is
disrupted by the presence of metal. If the disruption is high enough, an alarm will sound.
The specific level required to sound an alarm can be set depending on the sensitivity
desired. WTMDs only require a few seconds to detect metal found on an individual, so
passengers can be quickly processed. Although advancements in technology have
improved some security equipment and led to the development of new technology and
screening processes, the technology and functionality of walk through metal detectors
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used at screening checkpoints have remained relatively the same since their inception in
the 1960s. Since all firearms have metal components, the technology used in screening
and detecting firearms have remained unchanged for 40 years.
X-ray machines used to screen objects non-invasively for potential threats have
also remain relatively unchanged. The primary parts of luggage x-ray inspection systems
include the generator which generates x-rays, the detector to detect radiation after it has
passed through the baggage, the processing unit or computer, and the conveyor system
for moving the baggage into the system. The signal processing system processes the
amount of radiation transmitted back to the machine from the baggage and produces an
image based upon the type of material and density of the object. Modern X-ray machines
have the capability to display images in three colors; blue, orange, and green. Objects
displayed in blue are typically hard materials such as hard plastic or metal. Objects
displayed in green are plastics and alloys where the density isn't enough to make it blue
or black. Objects displayed in orange are biological materials which include all liquids
and gels, and other explosive or incendiary materials. The ability to identify objects based
upon their consistency and color displayed by the machine assists screeners in identifying
potentially harmful liquids and explosives. The concept of identifying and locating the
outline of prohibited items such as knives and firearms has remained consistent since the
application of x-ray machines into security screening.
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Chapter 5

Discussions and Implications
This research has provided a brief glimpse into assessing civilian aviation screening.
The question this research sought to answer was:


Has the federalization of airport screening in 2001-2002 increased the number of
firearm confiscations at screening checkpoints?

Answers to these questions can be found within the construct of the research findings.
Two major findings have been exposed during this research: (1) there is an extremely
limited amount of confiscation data available to the public due to either inconsistencies in
recordkeeping or information that is classified and (2) there is no significant difference in
the level of firearm confiscations after the federalization of the civilian aviation screening
process. When screening for firearms, there has been no significant difference in
confiscation levels since the federalization of civilian aviation screening. Inconsistencies
in record keeping and confidentiality of screening data limit the availability of research
that can be conducted by the general public. These limitations are due to numerous
changes in what is defined as a prohibited and/or confiscated item as outlined by the FAA
and TSA. There is very little information on screeners detecting prohibited items, as the
federal government has classified the performance of both its screening workforce and
detection equipment.
The technology of X-ray machines and magnetometers have remained consistent
over the period of time encompassing both groups of data. This disproves the argument
that advances in screening technology have had an effect on the number firearms

60

confiscated. We can assume that, although two different groups of people and processes
are bring performed, the same results are likely to occur. This reinforces the theory that it
doesn't matter if the person operating the X-ray machine or running the metal detector is
a TSA employee of an employee of a private security contractor, the results of firearms
confiscated are likely to be consistent.
There is no statistically significant difference in the number of firearms
confiscated between the two groups of data (private and public) at a significance level of
0.05. The increase in the number security personnel, improved technology and vast
increase in resources have led to no significant difference in the number of confiscated
firearms at airport screening checkpoints. The results of this study do not mean that both
private and public screeners are equally effective in their screening process nor does it
say that there is not a difference in firearm confiscations between the two groups. This
does not mean that either private or public sector screening services are more effective
than its counterpart, but rather they are equal in the number of confiscations at the
significance level of 0.05. The results of the t-test were calculated manually and later
confirmed using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS).
Future Research
The private versus public security debate will continue to be a heated topic among
industry professionals for years to come. The screening process will continue to evolve as
technology advances and the national security landscape transforms. The emerging threat
of plastic explosives allow for extensive research opportunities in the development of
state of the art screening technology. Research on the availability of confiscation data and
how data is collected by screeners and TSA personnel can help in the accuracy of
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information and may lead to more accurate predictive analysis. Performing this same
study with data of other confiscated items such as explosive devices and knives can draw
a more accurate comparison between private and public security screening. Performing
research at the local or regional level may provide more accurate results that may be
applicable to airports considering public or contract security services.
Research can be conducted on creating an ideal model of the civilian aviation
security screening process. This research can look at the processes involved in screening,
the types of technology used during the screening process, the type of staff and training
each screener must complete. Upon studying various screening methods used by private
and public screeners developing a model that can be considered to the ideal model may
be advantageous towards bettering aviation security.
Summary
The large number of people utilizing airports every day as their means of travel
provides for a hot terrorist target. Terrorist and criminal activity in the aviation industry is
not a new issue but has recently been highlighted here in the United States by the
September 2001 attacks. These attacks proved that increased security measures were
needed. The federalization of civilian aviation screening brought about the largest
government assumption of a previously private function in U.S. history. Thousands of
new jobs were created and billions of dollars in taxpayer funding were provided to
improve technology and the aviation screener. This study set out to determine if the
federalization of the screening process had any effect on the number of firearm
confiscations. Due to limited publically available data and inconsistencies in data
collection, firearms were the only category of confiscations available that provided
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sufficient data points (years of data) to conduct quantitative research. A study comparing
the theoretical screening process model used by the private sector and the process model
currently in use by the TSA was performed to determine if any technological advances
may have had an effect on the statistical results.
This quantitative research required the performance of an interrupted time series
analysis. Interrupted time series analysis evaluates the impact of one or more events on
the values in the time series. An interrupted time series analysis attempts to determine
whether an outside event affected subsequent observations. For an example, did the
implementation of a new economic policy improve economic performance, did a new
gun ordinance reduce violent crimes; or in this study, did the federalization of civilian
airport screening increase the number of confiscated firearms. Such comparison of an
"interrupted time series" was applied to this study of firearm confiscations at airport
checkpoints.
Because the TSA was created in November 2001 but not fully implemented until
November 2002, the 2001 and 2002 data of persons screened and confiscated firearms
was not used due to this period of transition in which there was a presence of both TSA
and private screeners in our nation's airports. Therefore, there were two data sets. The
first data set includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from years 1990 through
2000. The second set of data includes persons screened and firearms confiscated from
years 2003 through 2009. The total data that was used spans a twenty year period (19902009).
The results of the t-test concluded that there was no significant difference between
the number of firearm confiscations by private screeners and the number of firearms
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confiscated by government screeners. This indicated that the transition from private to
public screeners has had no effect on the number of firearm confiscations.
Future research can be utilized to further explore this critical area that impacts
anyone who travels by plane. Areas to be explored can include data collection methods,
civilian aviation screening models, and screening personnel comparisons at the local or
regional level. Due to the enormous amount of resources that are spent on aviation
security in our country, there is a clear need to develop the most effective and efficient
ways to keep our skies and airports safe and secure. Providing quality information to our
leaders and policy-makers is essential to make more effective decisions on aviation
security and to continually improve our screening models and methods.
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